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黄河教授:Contract Choice and Auction Design for IT Service Outsourcing  珠江管理论坛第48期

2019-11-28 10:51:00 来源:院科研办 点击: 收藏本文

主题: Contract Choice and Auction Design for IT Service Outsourcing

主讲人:黄河 重庆大学教授

时间:2019年11月28日(周四)下午3:00 

地点:学院301会议室

 

黄河,清华大学经济管理学院博士、国家万人计划青年拔尖人才、教育部新世纪优秀人才。现任重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师、副院长、党委委员、学术委员会委员、学位评定委员会委员等。研究兴趣包括,运作机制设计、信息系统经济分析、拍卖理论及应用等。黄河教授以第一作者在MIS QuarterlyProduction and Operations ManagementDecision Sciences等国际顶级期刊发表(录用)代表作多篇。主持国家级人才项目一项、国家自然科学基金面上项目三项和青年项目一项等。从事《运筹学》《随机建模与优化》《拍卖理论与机制设计》等课程教学,多次获得“重庆市优秀博士学位论文指导教师”、获得重庆大学第三届“最受学生欢迎老师”奖等。现担任信息管理国际著名期刊《Electronic Commerce Research & Applications》资深编辑 (Senior Editor);担任MISQISRDSJ等国际顶级期刊审稿人。兼任国际信息系统协会(AIS)中国分会理事、中国管理现代化研究会运作管理专业委员会委员、中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会委员、中国运筹学会企业运筹学分会理事等。曾任美国哥伦比亚大学、香港科技大学、香港理工大学等访问学者。

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摘要:IT service outsourcing has grown tremendously over the last two decades. In this talk, we focus on the contract design for IT service outsourcing under two scenarios. First, when the client has chosen one IT service provider, we consider two common solutions for addressing information asymmetry and uncertainty between the client and the provider: monitoring and renegotiation. Monitoring is mostly applied in time-and-materials contracts, as a basis for inspecting and reimbursing the provider’s effort in system development. Renegotiation, in contrast, is deployed in both fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts to mitigate the loss of surplus from uncertainty after system development occurs. We investigate the interaction between monitoring and renegotiation, and examine the corresponding contract choice problem.

Second, when the client selects from potential providers to outsource the IT service, we study the design of IT service contracts for procurement auctions. The IT project performance is jointly affected by client and provider investments, and the project scope can be renegotiated at the end of the probation period. The client can use the initial project scope and her own investment as instruments to curb the winning vendor's information rent and induce the vendor investment. We find that a broader initial project scope reduces the winning vendor's information rent and the incentive for post-auction investment, whereas the client's investment has the opposite effect. Interestingly, the two instruments can be substitutes or complements, depending on the vendor's bargaining power in the renegotiation.