题目：Costly Signaling in E-Commerce Markets: Empirical Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment on Taobao.com
地点：腾讯会议（会议号：853 355 951；密码：3931）
摘要：Reputation systems in e-commerce markets are widely adopted to mitigate information asymmetries, but instead they undermine market competition because new sellers are unlikely to sell their products. In this paper we study how signaling mechanisms can be employed by e-commerce markets to fix the drawback of reputation systems. Guided by a dynamic signaling theory, we compile data from the largest e-commerce market in China to examine the treatment effects of signaling programs on transactions under three scenarios: different signaling costs, different product values and different reputation ratings. The theoretical and empirical findings of the paper indicate the following requirements for an efficient signaling mechanism which can facilitate transactions of new sellers in an e-commerce market: 1. the reputation system of the market can generate reliable customer reviews; 2. the product value is high; 3. the signaling cost is high, especially for low-reputation sellers; and 4. the signaling cost and the status of taking signaling actions are factored in ranking the display order of sellers.